The Case of Rosika Schwimmer (1929)

The Case of Rosika Schwimmer

Alien Pacifists Not Wanted!

| Among all the decisions of the
Supreme Court since the war ad-
verse to civil liberty, none violate
the old traditions more squarely
than this.

^[In a country founded on principles
of religious freedom and liberty
of conscience, the Supreme Court
has now refused to admit to citi-
zenship persons who disbelieve
in bearing arms in its defense.
And this in the case of a 50 year
old woman who would never be
called on to bear arms!

II The decision would apply equally
to Quakers and members of other
religious sects whose principles
forbid taking part in war.

1 Already in recent years for the
first time in our history courts
have refused to grant citizenship
to an Irish Quakeress, a Mennonite
woman, a Seventh Day Adven-
tist and a member of the Church
of the Brethren, — all because of
their religious objections to bear-
ing arms.

TJAnd yet most of our state consti-
tutions and the draft act during
the war specifically exempted
members of such sects from bear-
ing arms. Our law recognized that
in a conflict between a citizen's
duty to his God and his duty to
his State, God should prevail.

Congress can change the naturalization law. A bill has been introduced
to overcome the Supreme Court decision. Support it.

Read the facts of this case and help!

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

100 Fifth Avenue

New York City

June, 1929.

10 cents

<0. <■ ™vC

The Case of Rosika Schwimmer

THE Supreme Court of the United States handed down on May
27, 1929, a decision denying citizenship to Mme. Rosika
Schwimmer, well-known Hungarian pacifist, solely because of
her refusal to bear arms in defense of the country. The decision
is sweeping. It applies to all aliens holding such views, whether
qualified for military service or not, and on any grounds, re-
ligious or humanitarian. Three justices dissented, — Holmes, Bran-
deis and Sanford.

The decision, applied as it was to a fifty year old woman who
would never be called on to bear arms, appears incredible on its
face. But the court evidently chose to close the doors to any appli-
cant with such views. And in the case of Mme. Schwimmer, the
court was plainly influenced by what the solicitor general de-
scribed as a "secondary consideration," Mme. Schwimmer's in-
fluence as a writer and lecturer on others qualified to bear arms.

The decision is of profound significance to all who profess
opposition to war, challenging them to action to overcome a de-
cision which strikes at their faith in a warless world. It is of signifi-
cance to all Quakers and members of religious sects opposed to
bearing arms, for none of their alien members can now become
citizens. Yet during all our history till recent years no court ever
refused to admit the members of such sects to citizenship. Indeed
they are counted among our most distinguished citizens, — not ig-
noring the fact that the President of the United States is of their
faith, though not of their traditional view on bearing arms.

The decision should not be regarded as brought about by Mme.
Schwimmer's personal views and well-known activities for world
peace, conspicuously as the organizer of the ill-fated "Ford Peace
Ship." It is in line with similar recent decisions of lower courts
in three states, which have refused citizenship to an Irish Quakeress,
secretary of the Y. W. C. A. in Portland, Oregon, to a Mennonite
woman in Ohio, a Seventh Day Adventist in Wisconsin and to a
Canadian member of the Church of the Brethren in the state of
Washington.

These decisions reflect the prejudice against extreme pacifists
aroused during the war, and capitalized since by professional patri-
otic and militarist organizations. The Supreme Court decision gives

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

point to the comment of the dean of a leading law school to the
effect that in the last analysis "The law in the United States is the
combined prejudices of five old gentlemen on the Supreme Court."

The American Civil Liberties Union is planning two courses
of action to overcome the Supreme Court decision. One, and the
most promising, is to back a bill in Congress to prohibit the denial
of citizenship to aliens because of their views on bearing arms.
Such a bill, in a form not yet satisfactory, has already been intro-
duced by Representative Anthony J. Griffin.

The other line of action is to get an alien member of a reli-
gious sect, preferably a woman, to apply for citizenship in a state,
not a federal court, and in a state with a constitutional exemption
from military service for religious objectors. Such a case would
raise the constitutional issue squarely, and might well achieve a
favorable result in the state, and if it reached the U. S. Supreme
Court a possible modification of the Schwimmer decision.

For the sake of making clear the issues raised by the Schwim-
mer case, we give here the essential parts of the proceedings and
decisions in all three courts through which it went.

The case was handled by Mme. Schwimmer 's attorney, Mrs.
Olive H. Rabe of Chicago, who volunteered her services without
fee. The American Civil Liberties Union and friends of Mme.
Schwimmer contributed the expenses. Mr. Gemmill of Chicago,
who assisted Mrs. Rabe, gave his services for a nominal fee.

The original proceeding was before the federal district court
at Chicago, which refused citizenship. Carried to the Circuit Court
of Appeals at Chicago, the three judges reversed the lower court
and ordered Mme. Schwimmer admitted to citizenship. The Gov-
ernment then applied to the Supreme Court for a review, which the
court granted. Altogether thirteen judges passed on the case, seven
holding against her, six for her.

The issue is best stated by giving first the portions of the
Supreme Court decision which deal directly with Mme. Schwim-
mer's views, together with the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes,
concurred in by Justice Brandeis. Justice Sanford also dissented,
merely approving the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.

THE CASE OP EOSIKA SCHWIMMER

The Supreme Court Decision

The majority opinion was written by Justice Butler, who, it
is interesting to note, was formerly a law partner of William D.
Mitchell, now attorney general, who as solicitor general handled
the government's case against Mme. Schwimmer in the Supreme
Court.

The court said, after rehearsing the facts and reviewing pre-
vious related decisions:

"We quite recently declared that: 'Citizenship is a high privi-
lege and when doubts exist concerning a grant of it, generally at
least, they should be resolved in favor of the United States and
against the claimant.' (United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463, 467).
And when, upon a fair consideration of the evidence adduced upon
an application for citizenship, doubt remains in the mind of the
court as to any essential matter of fact, the United States is en-
titled to the benefit of such doubt and the application should be
denied.

Duty to Defend Country

"That it is the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our
Government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a' fun-
damental principle of the Constitution.

"The common defense was one of the purposes for which the
people ordained and established the Constitution. It empowers
Congress to provide for such defense, to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to maintain a navy, to make rules for the Govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces, to provide for
organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for calling it
forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and
repel invasions; it makes the President commander in chief of the
army and navy and of the militia of the several States when called
into the service of the United States; it declares that a well-regu-
lated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

"Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens to dis-
charge their duty to bear arms in the country's defense detracts
from the strength and safety of the Government. And their opinions
and beliefs as well as their behavior indicating a disposition to
hinder in the performance of that duty are subjects of inquiry under
the statutory provisions governing naturalization and are of vital

THE CASE OF EOSIKA SCHWIMMER

importance, for if all or a large number of citizens oppose such
defense the 'good order and happiness' of the United States can-
not long endure.

Influence on Others

"And it is evident that the views of applicants for naturalization
in respect of 6uch matters may not be disregarded. The influence
of conscientious objectors against the use of military force in de-
fense of the principles of our Government is apt to be more detri-
mental than their mere refusal to bear arms. The fact that, by reason
of sex, age or other cause, they may be unfit to serve does not lessen
their purpose or power to influence others. It is clear from her
own statements that the declared opinions of respondent as to armed
defense by citizens against enemies of the country were directly
pertinent to the investigation of her application.

"The record shows that respondent strongly desires to become
a citizen. She is a linguist, lecturer and writer; she is well edu-
cated and accustomed to discuss government and civic affairs. Her
testimony should be considered having regard to her interest and
disclosed ability correctly to express herself.

"Her claim at the hearing that she possessed the required qual-
ifications and was willing to take the oath was much impaired by
other parts of her testimony. Taken as a whole it shows that her
objection to military service rests on reasons other than mere in-
ability because of her sex and age personally to bear arms.

"Her expressed willingness to be treated as the Government
dealt with conscientious objectors who refused to take up arms in
the recent war indicates that she deemed herself to belong to that
class. The fact that she is an uncompromising pacifist with no sense
of nationalism but only a cosmic sense of belonging to the human
family justifies belief that she may be opposed to the use of mili-
tary force as contemplated by our Constitution and laws. And her
testimony clearly suggests that she is disposed to exert her power
to influence others to such opposition.

"A pacifist in the general sense of the word is one who seeks
to maintain peace and to abolish war. Such purposes are in harmony
with the Constitution and policy of our Government. But the word
is also used and understood to mean one who refuses or is unwilling
for any purpose to bear arms because of conscientious considera-
tions and who is disposed to encourage others in such refusal. And
one who is without any sense of nationalism is not well bound or

THE CASE OP ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

held by the ties of affection to any nation or government. Such
persons are liable to be incapable of the attachment for and devo-
tion to the principles of our Constitution that is required of aliens
seeking naturalization.

War Records Cited

"It is shown by official records and everywhere well known that
during the recent war there were found among those who described
themselves as pacifists and conscientious objectors many citizens —
though happily a minute part of all — who were unwilling to bear
arms in that crisis and who refused to obey the laws of the United
States and the lawful commands of its officers and encouraged such
disobedience in others. Local boards found it necessary to issue
a great number of noncombatant certificates, and several thousand
who were called to camp made claim because of conscience for
exemption from any form of military service.

"Several hundred were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment
for offenses involving disobedience, desertion, propaganda and
sedition. It is obvious that the acts of such offenders evidence a want
of that attachment to the principles of the Constitution of which the
applicant is required to give affirmative evidence by the Naturali-
zation Act.

"The language used by respondent to describe her attitude in
respect of the principles of the Constitution was vague and am-
biguous; the burden was upon her to show what she meant and
that her pacifism and lack of nationalistic sense did not oppose the
principle that it is a duty of citizenship by force of arms when
necessary to defend the country against all enemies, and that her
opinions and beliefs would not prevent or impair the true faith
and allegiance required by the act. She failed to do so. The District
Court was bound by the law to deny her application.

"The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.
"The decree of the District Court is affirmed.

The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Holmes

"The applicant seems to be a woman of superior character and
intelligence, obviously more than ordinarily desirable as a citizen
of the United States. It is agreed that she is qualified for citizen-
ship except so far as the views set forth in a statement of facts
'may show that the applicant is not attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the

THE CASE OP KOSIKA SCHWIMMER

good order and happiness of the same, and except in so far as
the same may show that she cannot take the oath of allegiance
without a mental reservation.'

"The views referred to are an extreme opinion in favor of
pacifism and a statement that she would not bear arms to defend
the Constitution. So far as the adequacy of her oath is concerned
I hardly can see how it is affected by the statement, inasmuch
as she is a woman over 50 years of age, and would not be allowed
to bear arms if she wanted to. And as to the opinion the whole
examination of the applicant shows that she holds none of the
now-dreaded creeds but thoroughly believes in organized govern-
ment and prefers that of the United States to any other in the world.

"Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles of
the Constitution that she thinks that it can be improved. I suppose
that most intelligent people think that it might be. Her particular
improvement looking to the abolition of war seems to me not mate-
rially different in its bearing on this case from a wish to establish
cabinet government as in England, or a single house, or one term
of seven years for the President to touch a more burning question,
only a judge mad with partisanship would exclude because the
applicant thought that the eighteenth amendment should be repealed.

"Of course the fear is that if a war came the applicant would
exert activities such as were dealt with in Schenck v. United States,
249 U. S. 47. But that seems to me unfounded. Her position and
motives are wholly different from those of Schenck. She is an
optimist and states in strong and, I do not doubt, sincere words
her belief that war will disappear and that the impending des-
tiny of mankind is to unite in peaceful leagues.

"I do not share that optimism nor do I think that a philosophic
view of the world would regard war as absurd. But most people
who have known it regard it with horror, as a last resort, and
even if not yet ready for cosmopolitan efforts, would welcome
any practicable combinations that would increase the power on
the side of peace.

"The notion that the applicant's optimistic anticipations would
make her a worse citizen is sufficiently answered by her exami-
nation which seems to me a better argument for her admission than
any that I can offer. Some of her answers might excite popular
prejudice, but if there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls, for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that we
should adhere to that principle with regard to admission into,
as well as to life within this country.

"And recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant's way,
I would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make
the country what it is, that many citizens agree with the applicant's
belief and that I had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our
inability to expel them because they believe more than some of
us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount."

The Original Proceedings at Chicago

Mme. Schwimmer's application for citizenship was first heard
before Federal Judge George A. Carpenter in the district court at
Chicago in October, 1927. The judge examined her only on one
issue, that of her pacifist views. In all other respects he conceded
she qualified for citizenship.

The hearing brings out so clearly the conflict between Mme.
Schwimmer's views and the judge's notions of good citizenship
that the pertinent parts bear quotation.

Here is the colloquy between the judge and Mme. Schwimmer:

Q. Of course, I do not believe the time is ever coming when
this country, this Government, is going to send its women to fight.
We have not as yet a regiment of Amazons.

A. I hope you don't have.

Q. But we may have to send them as nurses to look after our
fighters. We may have to send them in the various religious or-
ganizations, like the Y. M. C. A. or the Knights of Columbus,
to give succor and aid to our fighters. Now, are you willing to
be sent on missions of that sort by this Government to look after
the boys that are fighting for this country?

A. I am willing to do everything that an American citizen has
to do, except fighting.

Q. Well, our women do not fight. We do not expect you to
shoulder a musket.

A. Oh, I am willing to obey every law that the American
Government compels its citizens to do.

Q. Are you willing to do anything that an American woman
is called upon to do? I mean an American citizen, a woman of
this country.

A. Yes, I am, because I have not found that anything was

9

THE CASE OP ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

asked that was against — I mean it is only the fighting question.
That is, if American women would he compelled to do that, I
would not do that

Q. You say you are an uncompromising pacifist?

A. Yes.

Q. How far does that go? Does it refer only to yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. That you are not going to use your fists on somebody?

A. Yes.

Q. Or that you disapprove of the Government fighting?

A. It means that I disapprove of the Government asking me
to fight.

Q. You mean fight personally?

A. Yes, physically.

Q. Carrying a gun?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that as far as it goes?

A. That is as far as it goes.

Q. Or is it more deep seated?

A. No.

Q. Really, of course, none of us wants war —

A. Yes.

Q. But there are a great many of us when war comes and our
country is in danger who get our backs to the wall —

A. Yes.

Q. And we fight until there is nothing but the wall left.

A. Yes.

Q. Now are you willing to do that?

A. lam afraid, your Honor, I did not catch the point of the
question. I am awfully sorry.

Q. I don't mean to bear arms for the country.

A. Yes.

Q. The time will never come, I venture to say, when the
women of the United States will have to bear arms.

A. Well, I am not willing to bear arms. In every other single
way, civic way, I am ready to follow the law and do everything
that the law compels American citizens to do. I am willing to do
that. That is why I say I can take the oath of allegiance because
as far as I, with the able help of my lawyers, could find out there
is nothing that I could be compelled to do that I could not do.

10

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

Q. Your lawyer can't search into your heart any more than
I can. You are the only one that can answer these questions.

A. I am opening my heart very frankly because there is noth-
ing to hide. As I said when the question came up, if it is a
question of fighting, as much as I desire American citizenship I
would not seek the citizenship.

Q. Now, is it a question of fighting personally?

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself?

A. Myself.

Q. You do not care how many other women fight?

A. I don't care because I consider it a question of conscience.
If there are women fighters, it is their business.

Q. Do you expect to spread this propaganda throughout this
country with other women?

A. Which propaganda may I ask?

Q. That you are an uncompromising pacifist and will not
fight.

A. Oh, of course, I am always ready to tell that to anyone
who wants to hear it.

Q. What is your occupation, Madame?

A. I am a writer and lecturer.

Q. And in your writings and in your lectures you take up
this question of war and pacifism?

A. If I am asked for that, I do.

Q. You know we have a great deal to give — at least we think
so —

A. I think so, too.

Q. — when we confer citizenship upon people of other coun-
tries.

A. I think so, too.

Q. And we expect when we do that, that they come in on an
equal footing, and out of regard to the other stockholders in this
Great United corporation we have to see to it that any partners or
stockholders coming in are willing to do what those who are already
here are willing to do. Now, it seems that your general views —

Now, I am not at all against people writing. There are a
great many American citizens who are now decrying the possibility
of the occurrence of war. They are against it. We have a great
many of pacifists in this country, but when the time comes, and
they are called out for the country, they forget all their views,

11

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

all of the things they have been talking about, and start in on the
defense of the home.

Now, you can't come in half way. You must come in the
whole distance, because there you are and under that flag is our
country, and you can't get under that flag unless you promise to
do every single thing that the citizens of this country not only
have permission to do, but are willing to do.

A. Well, I can only repeat what I said: that I am willing
to do everything that, to my knowledge to this day, American women
are asked to do.

The Court: Well, can we ask anything more than that?

The naturalization examiner then pushed the issue of her re-
fusal to fight, and the judge then put this question:

Q. If you were called to the service, and the kind of work
that women usually can perform better than the men can — say
as a nurse or as some one to give cheer to the soldiers — and you
were at some place in a war, which I hope never will come, and
you saw someone coming in the headquarters or the barracks,
wherever it was, with a pistol in his hand to shoot the back of
an officer of our country, and you had a pistol handy by, would you
kill him?

A. No, I would not

The Court: The application is denied.

Her attorney, W. B. Gemmill, associated with Mrs. Olive H.
Rabe, her chief counsel, then sought to bring out just what she
meant. Following is the colloquy between the judge, her attorney,
the naturalization examiner, Mr. Jordan, and herself:

Mr. Gemmill: I mean to say, your Honor, I am trying to
explain her answer. It wasn't the cold blooded murder of the
United States officer that Mrs. Schwimmer had in mind. It was
her feeling against the killing of any one.

The Witness: Yes.

The Court: I raised a question that might arise in any war,
and asked her what she would do if in order to save the life of
an officer of this country, whether it was a general officer or the
lowest man in the ranks, and she had the opportunity to kill the
enemy before he killed our soldier would she do it, and she said
"No."

The Witness: Yes.

Mr. Gemmill: May I ask one or two more questions?

12

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Gemmill: Under that same case, Mrs. Schwimmer, would
you have given the officer any warning, if it was possible?

A. Certainly.

Q. So that he could defend himself?

A. Certainly.

The Court: That is, you would have given him —

A. I would try to hit the pistol out of the man's hand who
tries to shoot. That is what I would try to do.

Q. Let me ask you this: Would you have thrown yourself
on the assailant?

A. Yes, I might do that.

Q. And run the risk of being shot yourself?

A. Yes, I might do that. Yes.

Mr. Jordan: You say you might do that?

A. Well, I speak of a possibilty. I can't say I would do
that. We speak of hypothetical things. I can't say I "will" do
that, because there is no occasion for it.

The Court: One never can tell until the occasion arises
what will be done.

The Witness: If it would happen this moment I would do
it.

The Court: But my first question referred not to your try-
ing to stop the man from reaching the American soldier.

The Witness: I understand.

The Court: — because he may have been ten feet off —

The Witness: I understand.

The Court: — and the American soldier would have been
killed before you could have reached his assailant.

The Witness: Yes.

The Court: I am asking if you had the weapon, if it were
handy by —

The Witness: Yes.

The Court: — would you have killed the assailant —

The Witness: No.

The Court: — before he reached the American soldier?

The Witness: No.

The Court: Then I am of the same opinion.

Mr. Gemmill: Supposing that pistol had been pointed at
you and you had a pistol?

A. I would not defend myself. I mean I wouldn't take a

13

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

pistol to defend myself even if you handed it to me; under no
circumstances.

The Court: That question is not involved at all. This is
a very close question, gentlemen, and I am really refusing this
because the Government, I think, has no appeal, but it is an atti-
tude — the attitude of the applicant — that I think is not common
with the women of this country.

The judge graciously wound up the proceedings with this :
"You understand, Madame, that while the Court may have said
some things that shock, perhaps, your views of nationalism, we are
here to administer the law as we see it. We have taken an oath for
that purpose and we try to live up to it. There is nothing per-
sonal about it all."

In the Court of Appeals

Mme. Schwimmer appealed at once from Judge Carpenter's
denial of citizenship to the Court of Appeals at Chicago. The
case was argued by her/ attorneys, Olive H. Rabe and W. B. Gem-
mill early in 1928. The unanimous decision of the three judges,
Anderson, Alschuler and Baltzell, was handed down in June 1928.
They reversed Judge Carpenter and ordered Mme. Schwimmer ad-
mitted to citizenship.

After stating the facts and referring to Supreme Court de-
cisions, the Court of Appeals said: (underscoring ours)

"The question for judgment was, Did she make it appear that
she had behaved, that is, conducted herself, as a person of good
moral character, attached and disposed as the statute requires dur-
ing the time fixed by it? Assuming that the time to be covered
by the inquiry ended with the hearing, her views, expressed then
or before that time, might be important as disclosing whether her
conduct was that required of applicants; but mere views are not,
by the statute, made a ground for denying a petition.

"The views expressed by the applicant at most reveal an un-
willingness personally to bear arms, and it being agreed that she has
shown herself in every other way qualified for citizenship, unless her
expressed unwillingness to bear arms makes her conduct that of
a person not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States, or not well disposed to the good order and happi-
ness of the same, her petition should have been granted. . . .

"We do not have before us the case of a male applicant for

14

THE CASE OF KOSIKA SCHWIMMER

admission who is able to bear arms and is within the usual con-
scription age, but the case of a woman fifty years of age.

"Women are considered incapable of bearing arms. Male
persons of the age of appellant have not been compelled to do
so. Appellant, if admitted, cannot by any present law of the
United States be compelled to bear arms. Judging by all the con-
scription acts of which we have knowledge, she never will be re-
quired to do so; yet she is denied admission to citizenship because
she says she will not fight with her fists or carry a gun.

"In other words, there is put to her a hypothetical question —
what would she do under circumstances that never have occurred
and probably never will occur — and upon her answers to this sup-
posed case her petition is denied. A petitioner's rights are not to
be determined by putting conundrums to her.

"The views of appellant relied upon to support the denial of
her application have no substantial relation to the inquiry author-
ized by the statute. They were immaterial to that inquiry and do
not furnish sufficient basis for the decree.

"Reversed and demanded, with direction to grant appellant's
petition."

The Issue

The case went up to the Supreme Court on appeal by the Gov-
ernment. The Department of Labor pushed it, evidently desiring
to settle an issue that had already arisen in other cases. The De-
partment was not neutral. It took the view that persons refusing
to bear arms were not qualified for citizenship, and had opposed
their naturalization before the courts. The issue was stated by
the Solicitor General in his brief in the Supreme Court as follows:

"The question presented in this case is whether it is a funda-
mental principle of the Constitution and of our organized Govern-
ment that they be defended by force of arms against armed in-
vasion or armed insurrection, and whether an alien pacifist who
will not bear arms in their defense and who is opposed to any
citizen bearing arms for that purpose, and whose willingness to
take the oath to support and defend the Constitution and laws
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, must be qualified by
a refusal to bear arms in defense of the Constitution or to support
such a requirement of others, is attached to the principles of the
Constitution and a believer in organized government within the

15

THE CASE OF ROSIKA SCHWIMMER

meaning of the naturalization laws so as to be eligible to citizen-
ship.

"A secondary question is presented, and that is whether a
woman who is a writer, author and propagandist of the doctrine
that armed force should not be used to maintain the Constitution
and Government should nevertheless be naturalized because in-
capable of bearing arms by reason of age and sex."

Mme. Schwimmer's attorney, Mrs. Rabe, put the issue in her
brief thus:

"The question presented by this case is whether Congress,
which alone has the power to prescribe qualifications for citizen-
ship, has prescribed that an applicant for citizenship shall be will-
ing to bear arms in defense of the United States even if such appli-
cant be incapable of bearing arms by reason of sex and age. In
other words, the question to be decided is whether a woman, fifty
years of age, in every other way qualified to become a citizen is
to be denied citizenship because of her views on pacifism."

Whichever way the issue is stated, the Supreme Court has
answered. The decision is a challenge to change the naturalization
law to express the purpose of Congress to abide by the old tradition,
by granting the privilege of citizenship, as we always did, to those
conscientiously opposed to bearing arms.

Those interested in this issue and who want further information
as to when and how to help overcome the Supreme Court decision,
please indicate it by filling out the form below. Tear off and mail.

Date

To the

American Civil Liberties Union

100 Fifth Avenue

New York City.

Send me further information as to when and how I can
help in the campaign to overcome the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Schwimmer case.

( Signed )

Address

City State..

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